Remarks

Remarks by Mr. Brian Green
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy October 19, 2006

"U.S. Missile Defense Policy and Practice for the 21st Century"

Introduction

Good morning. I would like to begin by thanking my hosts for the invitation to speak in the Czech Republic on U.S. missile defense policy. This issue is particularly timely and relevant given the current state of affairs in the Middle East and North Korea and on-going discussions between the U.S. and a number of allies, including the Czech Government, regarding future missile defense cooperation.

As most of you are no doubt aware, the growing prominence of ballistic missiles led the United States to field a limited defense of the U.S. homeland against long range missile attack. The-U.S. has also committed itself to extending these defenses to its friends and allies. I thought I would take the opportunity this morning to provide you with some insight into the strategic rationale for these decisions.

On July 4 of this year, North Korea tested seven ballistic missiles of various ranges. One of the missiles it is developing and has tested – the Taepo-dong 2 - has the potential of hitting the United States. All are threats to their neighbors. It is worth noting that North Korea conducted these tests in defiance of the international community and despite the risk of international isolation.

And now, just a few days ago, North Korea apparently conducted a nuclear test, again in defiance of the interpational community. This impoverished state, unpredictable and hostile, continues a single-minded pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. This is cause for deep concern, and not only for the United States.

In July and August of this year, Hezbollah fired thousands of rockets and missiles at Israel and at an Israeli ship. The fact that a non-state actor has access to such technology and weapons is also cause for concern. There is little reason to believe that the proliferation of technology and weapons from countries such as Iran to non-state groups such as Hezbollah will be limited only to the weapons used in these past few months. Iran also continues to pursue a nuclear program in defiance of the international community and continues to develop long-range ballistic missiles. We ignore only at our great peril this potential nexus of weapons of mass destruction, the means to deliver them at long ranges, and past willingness to provide advanced weaponry to non-state actors who have targeted civilian populations.

These developments are emblematic of a fundamental shift in the international security environment. The Cold War, in which the U.S. was principally concerned with containing and deterring the Soviet Union, has given way to a more complicated landscape in which uncertainty and surprise are more prominent and future threats harder to predict. Deterrence, on which we relied so heavily to prevent war with the Soviet Union, is more complex in this environment. Not only are threats harder to predict, but our adversaries such as North Korea can and do act in erratic and unpredictable ways. So, against this backdrop, I'd like to discuss how missile defense fits into broader U.S. defense strategy, including the strengthening of our cooperative security relationships. I'd also like to discuss with you the U.S. perspective on missile defense as a key capability that will enable the U.S., its allies, and friends to deal with the threats of the 21 st century.

Let's start by taking a look at missiles in today's security environment. Ballistic Missiles in Today's World Following the first Gulf War in 1991, there was much discussion about a "revolution in military affairs." The relatively easy military victory of the Coalition over one of the largest armies in the world seemed to validate the idea that dramatic advances in information technology were ushering in a new era in warfare in which speed and precision would replace mass.

There is much truth to this and we in the US are in fact intent on transforming our military to take advantage of these developments. But like any revolutionary period, all developments do not flow in one simple stream that benefits only a few nations. Looked at from a different perspective, military transformations include the proliferation of ballistic missiles to actual and potential adversaries who view these missiles and weapons of mass destruction as a new means of intimidation and warfare.

There are several factors shaping the ballistic missile threat to the US, its friends and allies. First, ballistic missiles and the technologies needed to build them are now widely available on the global market. Today, there are some 25 states that possess ballistic missiles. A number of these are developing the capacity for indigenous production and, ultimately, for export. Many of these states continue to increase the size, range, and accuracy of their _senals, while pursuing nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. This should underscore for us the link between ballistic missile and WMD programs. This group includes some of the world's most threatening and least responsible regimes, such as North Korea and Iran.

Second, powerful and enduring motivations drive the development of ballistic missiles and WMD. These motives derive, in large part, from their perceived utility as visible instruments of national military power and geopolitical influence. Ballistic missiles armed with WMD provide a capability that can be used in the pursuit of regional dominance by intimidating regional adversaries. But they are particularly valuable in that they are difficult to defend against and can counter potentially decisive U.S. and NATO advantages in conventional military capability by deterring intervention on behalf of a threatened state.

Furthennore, changes in the international security environment have accentuated the threats posed by these weapons. During the Cold War, ballistic missiles were widely held to be strategic assets-the delivery means for nuclear weapons, the use of which would be contemplated only under the most extraordinary circumstances. This constraint on the use of ballistic missiles, reinforced by the confines of the powerful psychological barriers of Cold War geo-politics, has crumbled since the 1980s. Ballistic missiles have been used in at least 10 conflicts since the mid-1980s. For example:

. During the 1980s, Iran and Iraq fired missiles at each others' capitals to undermine civilian morale during the "war of the cities."

. Libya fired ballistic missiles toward a U.S. base on Italian territory in retaliation for a U.S. air strike against Tripoli in 1986.

. Iraq in the first Gulf War fired missiles at civilian targets in Israel to try to break up the Coalition by drawing Israel into the war, and at military and civilian targets in Saudi Arabia to disrupt Coalition military operations and to intimidate the S_udi leaders and public. In fact, the single greatest U.S. loss of life in that conflict was caused by an Iraqi missile that hit a U.S. balTacks, killing 28 soldiers.

The use of ballistic missiles for military and coercive purposes shows no sign of abating. North Korea, for example, fired a missile over Japan in 1998 without warning, and as I have noted, fired seven ballistic missiles of varying ranges on July 4. While speculating on Kim Jong II's motives is always a high risk venture, the fact that the missiles were launched on our independence day, July 4, indicates that he was sending a message to the U.S. and its regional allies.

I've also mentioned that, during July and August, Hezbollah fired thousands of Iranian-supplied short-range rockets at Israel. Hezbollah may still hold in reserve longer-range Iranian missiles in Lebanon. Iran's profligate distribution of short range rockets and its use of ballistic missiles in its war with Iraq highlight the significance of its continued drive toward the development of long range missiles and WMD.

Iran's ballistic missile program, which we believe will eventually be able to reach deep into Europe, will pose a direct threat to European territory and populations. We also believe that Iran is working to develop missiles with intercontinental range, capable of threatening the United States. The development of threats like this, regardless of whether they come from Iran or some other country, has profound implications for the U.S. and our allies.

These threats have the potential to inhibit alliance or coalition freedom of action. Further, regional and intercontinental threats work together to undermine alliance cohesion. Our adversaries can use these threats to deter the U.S. from meeting its security obligations to its allies and friends, which can further discourage our allies and friends from meeting their alliance obligations. The idea of a state sponsor of terrorism, armed with ballistic missiles and WMD to provide it with unprecedented freedom of action, is one that bears careful thought. What if a hostile regional power armed with long­ range missiles were to demand that NATO should leave Afghanistan or Iraq? What if Iran were to push Gulf countries to reduce their ties with Europe or change their energy policy? How would Europe or the U.S. respond to state-sponsored terrorist activity within our borders, knowing that the state was so armed? I think that the U.S. and its allies and friends could benefit from discussions about the implications of well-armed regional powers.

Missile defense can, and we believe will, play a critical role in ensuring alliance cohesion and freedom of action. In combination with other capabilities, missile defenses can complement our traditional goals of nonproliferation and counterproliferation.

Missile defenses serve several important objectives:

. First, to assure our allies, friends, and publics that we will not be coerced by missile threats, and particularly if called upon to respond to aggression or fulfill our security commitments

. Second, to create closer relationships within our Alliances because the process of integrating national systems requires very close coordination;

. Third, potentially to help dissuade potential adversaries from investing in ballistic missiles;

. Fourth, to deter ballistic missile use by denying the benefits of attacks and, in doing so, reducing the ability of hostile states to intimidate;

. Fifth, to provide our leaders greater flexibility in a crisis by reducing the need to launch an offensive blow first since missile defenses could ward off an initial strike;

. And finally, to defend against ballistic missiles should deterrence fail.

In short, U.S. missile defense thinking holds that missile defenses may reduce the likelihood of armed conflict and if an armed conflict occurs, may confine the scope of the conflict and significantly reduce both civilian and military casualties. Recent conflicts provide evidence that this will continue to be true in the post-Cold war environment during the foreseeable future.

The 1991 and 2003 wars with Iraq are clear examples of how missile defense can support coalition goals during a confl.ict. One of the first things¨countries in the Gulf asked for in both conflicts was missile defenses to protect their territory and population centers. If this had not been available, host countries would have been less willing to allow forces to stage out of their territory.

Once hostilities began, missile defenses reassured the Israeli and Saudi governments and publics that the Coalition was doing its best to protect them. Within Saudi Arabia, missile defenses helped save lives, reassuring the public that they were safe throughout the conflict. In the case of Israel during the first Gulf War, U.S. and Dutch missile defenses helped to keep it out of the war. This was instrumental in maintaining the international coalition, which included forces from countries that were sensitive to Israeli military action.

As we know, the PATRIOT-2 missiles were only partially effective in the first Gulf War because they were designed to shoot down aircraft, not missiles. Nonetheless, they had the effect of showing the Israeli and Saudi publics that they were neither defenseless nor alone. In the second Gulf War, more advanced PATRIOTS had nearly a perfect record in defending coalition forces and the local population in both the staging countries and within Iraq.

Where Do We Go From Here

These experiences reinforce the U.S. conviction that we need to work closely with allies and friends on missile defenses that can reassure civilian populations, preserve freedom of action and alliance cohesion, and contribute to military effectiveness. The President has made cooperating with other nations on missile defense a cornerstone of U.S. missile defense policy.

Let's look at some examples at how we are doing that, beginning with NATO. The Alliance in 2005 began developing a missile defense command and control system -- the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Program -- which will integrate missile defense interceptors and sensors provided by NA TO nations to defend Alliance forces against short and medium range missile threats. The Program office is headed by a French General; an American serves as his Deputy.

NATO has also completed a Missile Defense Feasibility Study, which examines options for protecting the Alliance's European territory and populations against the full range of missile threats. This study is consistent with our own views about the feasibility and advisability of territorial missile defenses for Europe.

To that end, we are examining the potential for placing a small number of Ground-Based Interceptors in Central Europe to help defend the European and U.S. populations ITom long range missile attacks. This would be in keeping with the Feasibility Study's recommendation that missile defenses could evolve in an incremental manner by using existing and future national systems to benefit NATO.

We have been actively engaged in discussions with our allies, including the Czech and Polish Governments, to determine the best path forward. We are also developing missile defense partnerships with many of our other allies in NATO. There have been engagements, for example, with the UK and Denmark in the area of early warning radars that support missile defense operations. We are working with the Italians, Germans, and Dutch on shorter-range missile defense systems. The United States looks forward to broadening our collaboration with our fiiends and allies in this field.

As for Asia, our fiiends in Japan clearly recognize the importance of protecting their territory and population centers from North Korea and are building an independent but interoperable missile defense system that will consist of the sea-based Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor and Patriot P AC-3. Moreover, the United States and Japan, in coordination, are programming over $2 billion over the life of the program for co­ development of a larger, more capable Standard Missile-3 interceptor that will greatly improve the performance of the existing missile. And recently, Japan "and the U.S. placed a transportable X-band radar in Japan that will detect and track ballistic missile threats against both countries.

All of this collaborative work in Europe and Asia is creating closer alliance relations. Weare sharing information, co-developing defensive systems, and participating together in military exercises. The U.S. views the development of effective missile defenses to be an evolutionary process that will have to change and adjust to the ever changing international security environment. Fortunately, we have made great progress in developing effective missile defenses during the last five years:

. The upgraded PATRlOT-2 and the PATRIOT-3 shot down every Iraqi missile fired in the second Gulf War;

. On September 1, a Ground-Based Interceptor fired ITom Vandenberg Air Force Base in California hit and destroyed a target missile fired ITom Kodiak, Alaska in an end-to-end test of all the current operational elements of the ballistic missile defense system; and

. By the end of the year, U.S. Aegis ships with the Standard Missile-3 will be patrolling the Western Pacific to protect against North Korean missile attack. The SM-3 missile has hit seven out of eight targets in tests.

As Secretary Rumsfeld said after the successful test on September 1: "Tests will continue, some of which will be successful and some of which will not. This was a challenging test, and the tests will become even more challenging in the period ahead." In other words, what counts is not so much the immediate scorecard, but whether we are on the right path. We believe we are.

Conclusion

Our job, however, is not done. Some of the world's least responsible states continue to develop short, medium, and long range missiles. These states are seeking to intimidate their neighbors and to deter responsible powers from helping allies and friends if they are requested to do so.

As a result of these evolving and expanding threats, the United States and it allies must move beyond the initial development and fielding of missile defenses. And although the U.S. has a system to defend its populations and territories, we must continue to field missile defense to protect our deployed forces and we want to encourage the growing interest among our allies in cooperating with the U.S. on similar capabilities for Europe and Japan.

The U.S. government was criticized in the wake of 9/1 1 for not "connecting the dots" on the terrorist threat and failing to act to prevent the attacks. With respect to the ballistic missile threat, the dots are out there for all to see. I would not care to be before this conference in the wake of a ballistic missile attack explaining why, given all we know. of ballistic missiles in the hands of dangerous regimes, we had not acted to defend our people.

Our goals are not easy but they are necessary. The long lead-time for fielding of missile defenses requires our attention today to ensure the safety and national security of our countries tomorrow. Together, we have the expertise, the resources, and, I am confident, the political will to succeed in this endeavor.

Thank you very much for your attention, and again, I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you today.